Proposing a constitutional amendment to limit the authority of the governor to veto a bill passed by both houses of the Texas Legislature with a vote of at least two-thirds of the members of each house.
If enacted, SJR38 would amend Section 14 of Article IV of the Texas Constitution. This change would especially impact the operational dynamics between the legislative and executive branches of government in Texas, allowing legislation that shows a strong consensus among lawmakers to take effect without the governor's approval. Proponents of the amendment argue that it would prevent the governor from unilaterally opposing widely supported legislative measures, fostering a more cooperative governance model that reflects the will of a larger segment of the legislature and, by extension, the electorate.
SJR38 is a joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment that seeks to limit the authority of the governor of Texas to veto bills that have been passed by a two-thirds majority in both houses of the Texas Legislature. Under the current law, the governor has the power to disapprove legislation; however, this bill would allow bills to become law even if the governor opposes them, provided they have substantial bipartisan support. The goal of SJR38 is to enhance legislative independence and reduce the power of the executive branch in the lawmaking process.
The proposed amendment will be put to a public vote on November 4, 2025, allowing citizens to decide on the potential shift in legislative authority. The discussion around SJR38 exemplifies broader debates concerning the distribution of powers among state institutions and the importance of representative democracy in shaping governance in Texas.
There are points of contention surrounding SJR38, particularly regarding the balance of power between the governor's office and the legislature. Critics might argue that this proposed amendment could undermine the check-and-balance system intended by the framers of the state constitution. They may express concern that reducing the governor's veto power could lead to the passage of legislation that does not adequately consider executive insights or input, thus fostering a legislative environment that operates outside of the executive's oversight.